eden-emu/mbedtls
15
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull requests Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions

Rename mbedtls_platform_memcmp() to mbedtls_platform_memequal()

Browse source 
Signed-off-by: Piotr Nowicki <piotr.nowicki@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Piotr Nowicki 2020-06-23 12:59:56 +02:00
parent c6319a70ab
commit e3c4ee51b2
21 changed files with 61 additions and 61 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

14
library/ssl_srv.c
View file

@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
/* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */
if( len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len ||
buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len ||
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data,
mbedtls_platform_memequal( buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data,
ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) );
@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
cur_len = *theirs++;
if( cur_len == ours_len &&
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( theirs, *ours, cur_len ) == 0 )
mbedtls_platform_memequal( theirs, *ours, cur_len ) == 0 )
{
ssl->alpn_chosen = *ours;
return( 0 );
@ -1228,7 +1228,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
ssl->handshake->hello_random_set = MBEDTLS_SSL_FI_FLAG_UNSET;
memset( ssl->handshake->randbytes, 0, 64 );
mbedtls_platform_memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32 - chal_len, p, chal_len );
if( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32 - chal_len, p, chal_len ) == 0 )
if( mbedtls_platform_memequal( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32 - chal_len, p, chal_len ) == 0 )
{
ssl->handshake->hello_random_set = MBEDTLS_SSL_FI_FLAG_SET;
}
@ -1628,7 +1628,7 @@ read_record_header:
* fragment_offset == 0 and fragment_length == length
*/
if( ssl->in_msg[6] != 0 || ssl->in_msg[7] != 0 || ssl->in_msg[8] != 0 ||
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 1, ssl->in_msg + 9, 3 ) != 0 )
mbedtls_platform_memequal( ssl->in_msg + 1, ssl->in_msg + 9, 3 ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ClientHello fragmentation not supported" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
@ -1728,7 +1728,7 @@ read_record_header:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32 );
mbedtls_platform_memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes, buf + 2, 32 );
if( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( ssl->handshake->randbytes, buf + 2, 32 ) == 0 )
if( mbedtls_platform_memequal( ssl->handshake->randbytes, buf + 2, 32 ) == 0 )
{
ssl->handshake->hello_random_set = MBEDTLS_SSL_FI_FLAG_SET;
}
@ -2827,7 +2827,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
p += 28;
ssl->handshake->hello_random_set = MBEDTLS_SSL_FI_FLAG_UNSET;
mbedtls_platform_memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 6, 32 );
if( mbedtls_platform_memcmp( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 6, 32 ) == 0 )
if( mbedtls_platform_memequal( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 6, 32 ) == 0 )
{
ssl->handshake->hello_random_set = MBEDTLS_SSL_FI_FLAG_SET;
}
@ -4119,7 +4119,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned cha
/* Identity is not a big secret since clients send it in the clear,
* but treat it carefully anyway, just in case */
if( n != ssl->conf->psk_identity_len ||
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n ) != 0 )
mbedtls_platform_memequal( ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n ) != 0 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY;
}