Let MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN to be split into outward & inward sizes
For the situation where the mbedTLS device has limited RAM, but the other end of the connection doesn't support the max_fragment_length extension. To be spec-compliant, mbedTLS has to keep a 16384 byte incoming buffer. However the outgoing buffer can be made smaller without breaking spec compliance, and we save some RAM. See comments in include/mbedtls/config.h for some more details. (The lower limit of outgoing buffer size is the buffer size used during handshake/cert negotiation. As the handshake is half-duplex it might even be possible to store this data in the "incoming" buffer during the handshake, which would save even more RAM - but it would also be a lot hackier and error-prone. I didn't really explore this possibility, but thought I'd mention it here in case someone sees this later on a mission to jam mbedTLS into an even tinier RAM footprint.)
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7 changed files with 198 additions and 87 deletions
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@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ static void ssl_write_hostname_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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size_t *olen )
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{
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
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size_t hostname_len;
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*olen = 0;
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@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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size_t *olen )
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{
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
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*olen = 0;
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@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static void ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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size_t *olen )
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{
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
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size_t sig_alg_len = 0;
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const int *md;
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
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@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static void ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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size_t *olen )
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{
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
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unsigned char *elliptic_curve_list = p + 6;
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size_t elliptic_curve_len = 0;
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const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *info;
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@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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size_t *olen )
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{
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
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*olen = 0;
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@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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{
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int ret;
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
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size_t kkpp_len;
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*olen = 0;
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@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ static void ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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size_t *olen )
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{
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
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*olen = 0;
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@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ static void ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
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{
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
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*olen = 0;
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@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
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{
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
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*olen = 0;
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@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
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{
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
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*olen = 0;
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@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ static void ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
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{
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
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size_t tlen = ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len;
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*olen = 0;
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@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ static void ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
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{
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
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size_t alpnlen = 0;
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const char **cur;
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@ -2117,7 +2117,7 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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size_t len_bytes = ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ? 0 : 2;
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unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset;
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if( offset + len_bytes > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN )
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if( offset + len_bytes > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small for encrypted pms" ) );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
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@ -2160,7 +2160,7 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_encrypt( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
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p, ssl->handshake->pmslen,
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ssl->out_msg + offset + len_bytes, olen,
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MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN - offset - len_bytes,
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MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - offset - len_bytes,
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ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt", ret );
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@ -2926,7 +2926,7 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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i = 4;
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n = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
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if( i + 2 + n > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN )
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if( i + 2 + n > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "psk identity too long or "
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"SSL buffer too short" ) );
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@ -2962,7 +2962,7 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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*/
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n = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len;
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if( i + 2 + n > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN )
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if( i + 2 + n > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "psk identity or DHM size too long"
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" or SSL buffer too short" ) );
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@ -2991,7 +2991,7 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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* ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic public;
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*/
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ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &n,
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&ssl->out_msg[i], MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN - i,
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&ssl->out_msg[i], MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - i,
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ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
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if( ret != 0 )
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{
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@ -3032,7 +3032,7 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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i = 4;
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ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
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ssl->out_msg + i, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN - i, &n,
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ssl->out_msg + i, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - i, &n,
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ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
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if( ret != 0 )
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{
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