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Merge branch 'mbedtls-2.1-iotssl-1071-ca-flags'

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Fixes a regression introduced by an earlier commit that modified
x509_crt_verify_top() to ensure that valid certificates that are after past or
future valid in the chain are processed. However the change introduced a change
in behaviour that caused the verification flags MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED and
MBEDTLS_BADCERT_FUTURE to always be set whenever there is a failure in the
verification regardless of the cause.

The fix maintains both behaviours:

 * Ensure that valid certificates after future and past are verified
 * Ensure that the correct verification flags are set.
This commit is contained in:
Simon Butcher 2017-02-27 20:24:55 +00:00
commit d352e6dfcc
5 changed files with 88 additions and 12 deletions
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33
library/x509_crt.c
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@ -1893,6 +1893,7 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_top(
int check_path_cnt;
unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
mbedtls_x509_crt *future_past_ca = NULL;
if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &child->valid_to ) )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED;
@ -1947,16 +1948,6 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_top(
continue;
}
if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &trust_ca->valid_to ) )
{
continue;
}
if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &trust_ca->valid_from ) )
{
continue;
}
if( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( child->sig_pk, child->sig_opts, &trust_ca->pk,
child->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) != 0 )
@ -1964,6 +1955,20 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_top(
continue;
}
if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &trust_ca->valid_to ) ||
mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &trust_ca->valid_from ) )
{
if ( future_past_ca == NULL )
future_past_ca = trust_ca;
continue;
}
break;
}
if( trust_ca != NULL || ( trust_ca = future_past_ca ) != NULL )
{
/*
* Top of chain is signed by a trusted CA
*/
@ -1971,8 +1976,6 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_top(
if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, child->sig_pk, &trust_ca->pk ) != 0 )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
break;
}
/*
@ -1992,6 +1995,12 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_top(
((void) ca_crl);
#endif
if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &trust_ca->valid_to ) )
ca_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED;
if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &trust_ca->valid_from ) )
ca_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE;
if( NULL != f_vrfy )
{
if( ( ret = f_vrfy( p_vrfy, trust_ca, path_cnt + 1,