RSA PSS: fix first byte check for keys of size 8N+1
For a key of size 8N+1, check that the first byte after applying the public key operation is 0 (it could have been 1 instead). The code was incorrectly doing a no-op check instead, which led to invalid signatures being accepted. Not a security flaw, since you would need the private key to craft such an invalid signature, but a bug nonetheless.
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2 changed files with 11 additions and 3 deletions
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@ -1371,15 +1371,15 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
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*/
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msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1;
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if( buf[0] >> ( 8 - siglen * 8 + msb ) )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
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/* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */
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if( msb % 8 == 0 )
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{
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p++;
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siglen -= 1;
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}
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else
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if( buf[0] >> ( 8 - siglen * 8 + msb ) )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
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if( siglen < hlen + 2 )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
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