Add warnings regarding the use of DHM in general
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@ -19,6 +19,29 @@
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* limitations under the License.
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*
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* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
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*
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* \warning The security of the DHM key exchange relies on the proper choice
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* of prime modulus - optimally, it should be a safe prime. The usage
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* of non-safe primes both decreases the difficulty of the underlying
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* discrete logarithm problem and can lead to small subgroup attacks
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* leaking private exponent bits when invalid public keys are used
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* and not detected. This is especially relevant if the same DHM parameters
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* are reused for multiple key exchanges as in static DHM, while the
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* criticality of small-subgroup attacks is lower for ephemeral DHM.
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*
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* For performance reasons, the code does neither perform primality
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* nor safe primality tests, nor the expensive checks for invalid
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* subgroups.
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*
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* The possibility for the use of custom, non-safe primes in DHM
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* is a deficiency in the TLS protocol that has been adressed only
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* recently through the addition of the named group extension from
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* RFC 7919, which however is not yet implemented in Mbed TLS.
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*
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* If possible, we recommend to use elliptic curve based key
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* exchanges instead of DHM-based ones, because the former only
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* accepts standardized groups.
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*
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*/
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#ifndef MBEDTLS_DHM_H
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#define MBEDTLS_DHM_H
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