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Merge branch 'mbedtls-2.7-restricted' into mbedtls-2.7.16r0

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This commit is contained in:
Janos Follath 2020-06-25 09:20:57 +01:00
commit 9cdda866bf
11 changed files with 496 additions and 11 deletions
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366
library/ecp.c
View file

@ -94,6 +94,20 @@
#include "mbedtls/ecp_internal.h"
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#include "mbedtls/sha512.h"
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#include "mbedtls/sha256.h"
#else
#error "Invalid configuration detected. Include check_config.h to ensure that the configuration is valid."
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */
#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
!defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
#define inline __inline
@ -112,6 +126,233 @@ static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) {
static unsigned long add_count, dbl_count, mul_count;
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
/*
* Currently ecp_mul() takes a RNG function as an argument, used for
* side-channel protection, but it can be NULL. The initial reasoning was
* that people will pass non-NULL RNG when they care about side-channels, but
* unfortunately we have some APIs that call ecp_mul() with a NULL RNG, with
* no opportunity for the user to do anything about it.
*
* The obvious strategies for addressing that include:
* - change those APIs so that they take RNG arguments;
* - require a global RNG to be available to all crypto modules.
*
* Unfortunately those would break compatibility. So what we do instead is
* have our own internal DRBG instance, seeded from the secret scalar.
*
* The following is a light-weight abstraction layer for doing that with
* HMAC_DRBG (first choice) or CTR_DRBG.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
/* DRBG context type */
typedef mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ecp_drbg_context;
/* DRBG context init */
static inline void ecp_drbg_init( ecp_drbg_context *ctx )
{
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( ctx );
}
/* DRBG context free */
static inline void ecp_drbg_free( ecp_drbg_context *ctx )
{
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( ctx );
}
/* DRBG function */
static inline int ecp_drbg_random( void *p_rng,
unsigned char *output, size_t output_len )
{
return( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random( p_rng, output, output_len ) );
}
/* DRBG context seeding */
static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx,
const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len )
{
int ret;
unsigned char secret_bytes[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
/* The list starts with strong hashes */
const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = mbedtls_md_list()[0];
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_type );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret,
secret_bytes, secret_len ) );
ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( ctx, md_info, secret_bytes, secret_len );
cleanup:
mbedtls_zeroize( secret_bytes, secret_len );
return( ret );
}
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
/* DRBG context type */
typedef mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ecp_drbg_context;
/* DRBG context init */
static inline void ecp_drbg_init( ecp_drbg_context *ctx )
{
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( ctx );
}
/* DRBG context free */
static inline void ecp_drbg_free( ecp_drbg_context *ctx )
{
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free( ctx );
}
/* DRBG function */
static inline int ecp_drbg_random( void *p_rng,
unsigned char *output, size_t output_len )
{
return( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random( p_rng, output, output_len ) );
}
/*
* Since CTR_DRBG doesn't have a seed_buf() function the way HMAC_DRBG does,
* we need to pass an entropy function when seeding. So we use a dummy
* function for that, and pass the actual entropy as customisation string.
* (During seeding of CTR_DRBG the entropy input and customisation string are
* concatenated before being used to update the secret state.)
*/
static int ecp_ctr_drbg_null_entropy(void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t len)
{
(void) ctx;
memset( out, 0, len );
return( 0 );
}
/* DRBG context seeding */
static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx,
const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len )
{
int ret;
unsigned char secret_bytes[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret,
secret_bytes, secret_len ) );
ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed( ctx, ecp_ctr_drbg_null_entropy, NULL,
secret_bytes, secret_len );
cleanup:
mbedtls_zeroize( secret_bytes, secret_len );
return( ret );
}
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
/* This will be used in the self-test function */
#define ECP_ONE_STEP_KDF
/*
* We need to expand secret data (the scalar) into a longer stream of bytes.
*
* We'll use the One-Step KDF from NIST SP 800-56C, with option 1 (H is a hash
* function) and empty FixedInfo. (Though we'll make it fit the DRBG API for
* convenience, this is not a full-fledged DRBG, but we don't need one here.)
*
* We need a basic hash abstraction layer to use whatever SHA-2 is available.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
#define HASH_FUNC( in, ilen, out ) mbedtls_sha512_ret( in, ilen, out, 0 );
#define HASH_BLOCK_BYTES ( 512 / 8 )
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
#define HASH_FUNC( in, ilen, out ) mbedtls_sha256_ret( in, ilen, out, 0 );
#define HASH_BLOCK_BYTES ( 256 / 8 )
#endif /* SHA512/SHA256 abstraction */
/*
* State consists of a 32-bit counter plus the secret value.
*
* We stored them concatenated in a single buffer as that's what will get
* passed to the hash function.
*/
typedef struct {
size_t total_len;
uint8_t buf[4 + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
} ecp_drbg_context;
static void ecp_drbg_init( ecp_drbg_context *ctx )
{
memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( ecp_drbg_context ) );
}
static void ecp_drbg_free( ecp_drbg_context *ctx )
{
mbedtls_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( ecp_drbg_context ) );
}
static int ecp_drbg_seed( ecp_drbg_context *ctx,
const mbedtls_mpi *secret, size_t secret_len )
{
ctx->total_len = 4 + secret_len;
memset( ctx->buf, 0, 4);
return( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( secret, ctx->buf + 4, secret_len ) );
}
static int ecp_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t output_len )
{
ecp_drbg_context *ctx = p_rng;
int ret;
size_t len_done = 0;
uint8_t tmp[HASH_BLOCK_BYTES];
while( len_done < output_len )
{
uint8_t use_len;
/* This function is only called for coordinate randomisation, which
* happens only twice in a scalar multiplication. Each time needs a
* random value in the range [2, p-1], and gets it by drawing len(p)
* bytes from this function, and retrying up to 10 times if unlucky.
*
* So for the largest curve, each scalar multiplication draws at most
* 20 * 66 bytes. The minimum block size is 32 (SHA-256), so with
* rounding that means a most 20 * 3 blocks.
*
* Since we don't need to draw more that 255 blocks, don't bother
* with carry propagation and just return an error instead. We can
* change that it we even need to draw more blinding values.
*/
ctx->buf[3] += 1;
if( ctx->buf[3] == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED );
ret = HASH_FUNC( ctx->buf, ctx->total_len, tmp );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
if( output_len - len_done > HASH_BLOCK_BYTES )
use_len = HASH_BLOCK_BYTES;
else
use_len = output_len - len_done;
memcpy( output + len_done, tmp, use_len );
len_done += use_len;
}
mbedtls_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
return( 0 );
}
#else /* DRBG/SHA modules */
#error "Invalid configuration detected. Include check_config.h to ensure that the configuration is valid."
#endif /* DRBG/SHA modules */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \
@ -1357,7 +1598,9 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb_core( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R
i = d;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_select_comb( grp, R, T, t_len, x[i] ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &R->Z, 1 ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
if( f_rng != 0 )
#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_jac( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) );
while( i-- != 0 )
@ -1486,7 +1729,9 @@ static int ecp_mul_comb( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
*
* Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
if( f_rng != 0 )
#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_jac( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_jac( grp, R ) );
@ -1689,7 +1934,9 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
MOD_ADD( RP.X );
/* Randomize coordinates of the starting point */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
if( f_rng != NULL )
#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, &RP, f_rng, p_rng ) );
/* Loop invariant: R = result so far, RP = R + P */
@ -1722,7 +1969,9 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
*
* Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
if( f_rng != NULL )
#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_randomize_mxz( grp, R, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_normalize_mxz( grp, R ) );
@ -1746,6 +1995,11 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_mul( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
char is_grp_capable = 0;
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
ecp_drbg_context drbg_ctx;
ecp_drbg_init( &drbg_ctx );
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */
/* Common sanity checks */
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &P->Z, 1 ) != 0 )
@ -1755,32 +2009,46 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_mul( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
( ret = mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( grp, P ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
if( f_rng == NULL )
{
const size_t m_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_drbg_seed( &drbg_ctx, m, m_len ) );
f_rng = &ecp_drbg_random;
p_rng = &drbg_ctx;
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
if ( is_grp_capable = mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) )
{
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( grp ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */
#if defined(ECP_MONTGOMERY)
if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY )
ret = ecp_mul_mxz( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng );
#endif
#if defined(ECP_SHORTWEIERSTRASS)
if( ecp_get_type( grp ) == ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS )
ret = ecp_mul_comb( grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
cleanup:
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
cleanup:
if ( is_grp_capable )
{
mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( grp );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
ecp_drbg_free( &drbg_ctx );
#endif
return( ret );
}
@ -2145,6 +2413,76 @@ cleanup:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
#if defined(ECP_ONE_STEP_KDF)
/*
* There are no test vectors from NIST for the One-Step KDF in SP 800-56C,
* but unofficial ones can be found at:
* https://github.com/patrickfav/singlestep-kdf/wiki/NIST-SP-800-56C-Rev1:-Non-Official-Test-Vectors
*
* We only use the ones with empty fixedInfo, and for brevity's sake, only
* 40-bytes output (with SHA-256 that's more than one block, and with SHA-512
* less than one block).
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
static const uint8_t test_kdf_z[16] = {
0x3b, 0xa9, 0x79, 0xe9, 0xbc, 0x5e, 0x3e, 0xc7,
0x61, 0x30, 0x36, 0xb6, 0xf5, 0x1c, 0xd5, 0xaa,
};
static const uint8_t test_kdf_out[40] = {
0x3e, 0xf6, 0xda, 0xf9, 0x51, 0x60, 0x70, 0x5f,
0xdf, 0x21, 0xcd, 0xab, 0xac, 0x25, 0x7b, 0x05,
0xfe, 0xc1, 0xab, 0x7c, 0xc9, 0x68, 0x43, 0x25,
0x8a, 0xfc, 0x40, 0x6e, 0x5b, 0xf7, 0x98, 0x27,
0x10, 0xfa, 0x7b, 0x93, 0x52, 0xd4, 0x16, 0xaa,
};
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
static const uint8_t test_kdf_z[16] = {
0xc8, 0x3e, 0x35, 0x8e, 0x99, 0xa6, 0x89, 0xc6,
0x7d, 0xb4, 0xfe, 0x39, 0xcf, 0x8f, 0x26, 0xe1,
};
static const uint8_t test_kdf_out[40] = {
0x7d, 0xf6, 0x41, 0xf8, 0x3c, 0x47, 0xdc, 0x28,
0x5f, 0x7f, 0xaa, 0xde, 0x05, 0x64, 0xd6, 0x25,
0x00, 0x6a, 0x47, 0xd9, 0x1e, 0xa4, 0xa0, 0x8c,
0xd7, 0xf7, 0x0c, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xa0, 0x72, 0x66,
0x69, 0x0e, 0x25, 0xaa, 0xa1, 0x63, 0x14, 0x79,
};
#endif
static int ecp_kdf_self_test( void )
{
int ret;
ecp_drbg_context kdf_ctx;
mbedtls_mpi scalar;
uint8_t out[sizeof( test_kdf_out )];
ecp_drbg_init( &kdf_ctx );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &scalar );
memset( out, 0, sizeof( out ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &scalar,
test_kdf_z, sizeof( test_kdf_z ) ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_drbg_seed( &kdf_ctx,
&scalar, sizeof( test_kdf_z ) ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecp_drbg_random( &kdf_ctx, out, sizeof( out ) ) );
if( memcmp( out, test_kdf_out, sizeof( out ) ) != 0 )
ret = -1;
cleanup:
ecp_drbg_free( &kdf_ctx );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &scalar );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* ECP_ONE_STEP_KDF */
/*
* Checkup routine
*/
@ -2256,6 +2594,24 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_self_test( int verbose )
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" );
#if defined(ECP_ONE_STEP_KDF)
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( " ECP test #3 (internal KDF): " );
ret = ecp_kdf_self_test();
if( ret != 0 )
{
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
ret = 1;
goto cleanup;
}
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" );
#endif /* ECP_ONE_STEP_KDF */
cleanup:
if( ret < 0 && verbose != 0 )

14
library/ssl_tls.c
View file

@ -2119,10 +2119,20 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
ssl_read_memory( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen, padlen );
mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect );
/* Call mbedtls_md_process at least once due to cache attacks
* that observe whether md_process() was called of not */
/* Dummy calls to compression function.
* Call mbedtls_md_process at least once due to cache attacks
* that observe whether md_process() was called of not.
* Respect the usual start-(process|update)-finish sequence for
* the sake of hardware accelerators that might require it. */
mbedtls_md_starts( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec );
for( j = 0; j < extra_run + 1; j++ )
mbedtls_md_process( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, ssl->in_msg );
{
/* The switch statement above already checks that we're using
* one of MD-5, SHA-1, SHA-256 or SHA-384. */
unsigned char tmp[384 / 8];
mbedtls_md_finish( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec, tmp );
}
mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ssl->transform_in->md_ctx_dec );

3
library/version_features.c
View file

@ -339,6 +339,9 @@ static const char *features[] = {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM)
"MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG)
"MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_INTERNAL_RNG */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
"MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */