Redo of PR#5345. Fixed spelling and typographical errors found by CodeSpell.

Signed-off-by: Shaun Case <warmsocks@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman <dave.rodgman@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Shaun Case 2021-12-20 21:14:10 -08:00 committed by Dave Rodgman
parent 5479f5321a
commit 8b0ecbccf4
78 changed files with 151 additions and 151 deletions

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@ -1089,7 +1089,7 @@ typedef unsigned char mbedtls_be128[16];
*
* This function multiplies a field element by x in the polynomial field
* representation. It uses 64-bit word operations to gain speed but compensates
* for machine endianess and hence works correctly on both big and little
* for machine endianness and hence works correctly on both big and little
* endian machines.
*/
static void mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble( unsigned char r[16],
@ -1189,7 +1189,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx,
unsigned char *prev_output = output - 16;
/* Copy ciphertext bytes from the previous block to our output for each
* byte of cyphertext we won't steal. At the same time, copy the
* byte of ciphertext we won't steal. At the same time, copy the
* remainder of the input for this final round (since the loop bounds
* are the same). */
for( i = 0; i < leftover; i++ )

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@ -2278,7 +2278,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gcd( mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B
* TA-TB is even so the division by 2 has an integer result.
* Invariant (I) is preserved since any odd divisor of both TA and TB
* also divides |TA-TB|/2, and any odd divisor of both TA and |TA-TB|/2
* also divides TB, and any odd divisior of both TB and |TA-TB|/2 also
* also divides TB, and any odd divisor of both TB and |TA-TB|/2 also
* divides TA.
*/
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &TA, &TB ) >= 0 )

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@ -690,7 +690,7 @@ cleanup:
/*
* Conditionally swap X and Y, without leaking information
* about whether the swap was made or not.
* Here it is not ok to simply swap the pointers, which whould lead to
* Here it is not ok to simply swap the pointers, which would lead to
* different memory access patterns when X and Y are used afterwards.
*/
int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X,

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@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ cleanup:
/*
* Read a ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList (7.4.2.3) and check proofs
* Ouputs: verified peer public keys Xa, Xb
* Outputs: verified peer public keys Xa, Xb
*/
static int ecjpake_kkpp_read( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info,
const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,

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@ -1267,7 +1267,7 @@ cleanup:
* For curves in short Weierstrass form, we do all the internal operations in
* Jacobian coordinates.
*
* For multiplication, we'll use a comb method with coutermeasueres against
* For multiplication, we'll use a comb method with countermeasures against
* SPA, hence timing attacks.
*/
@ -2231,7 +2231,7 @@ static unsigned char ecp_pick_window_size( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
* This function is mainly responsible for administrative work:
* - managing the restart context if enabled
* - managing the table of precomputed points (passed between the below two
* functions): allocation, computation, ownership tranfer, freeing.
* functions): allocation, computation, ownership transfer, freeing.
*
* It delegates the actual arithmetic work to:
* ecp_precompute_comb() and ecp_mul_comb_with_precomp()
@ -2365,7 +2365,7 @@ cleanup:
/*
* For Montgomery curves, we do all the internal arithmetic in projective
* coordinates. Import/export of points uses only the x coordinates, which is
* internaly represented as X / Z.
* internally represented as X / Z.
*
* For scalar multiplication, we'll use a Montgomery ladder.
*/
@ -2519,7 +2519,7 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
MPI_ECP_LSET( &R->Z, 0 );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &R->Y );
/* RP.X might be sligtly larger than P, so reduce it */
/* RP.X might be slightly larger than P, so reduce it */
MOD_ADD( &RP.X );
/* Randomize coordinates of the starting point */

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@ -561,8 +561,8 @@ static void *buffer_alloc_calloc_mutexed( size_t n, size_t size )
static void buffer_alloc_free_mutexed( void *ptr )
{
/* We have to good option here, but corrupting the heap seems
* worse than loosing memory. */
/* We have no good option here, but corrupting the heap seems
* worse than losing memory. */
if( mbedtls_mutex_lock( &heap.mutex ) )
return;
buffer_alloc_free( ptr );

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@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ static int pk_use_ecparams( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_group *g
}
/*
* grp may already be initilialized; if so, make sure IDs match
* grp may already be initialized; if so, make sure IDs match
*/
if( grp->id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE && grp->id != grp_id )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT );
@ -808,7 +808,7 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa,
goto cleanup;
#else
/* Verify existance of the CRT params */
/* Verify existence of the CRT params */
if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 )

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@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
goto error;
}
/* Enforce that the usage policy permits the requested algortihm. */
/* Enforce that the usage policy permits the requested algorithm. */
if( alg != 0 )
{
status = psa_key_policy_permits( &slot->attr.policy,

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@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_update(
* preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_aead_update().
* - \p tag contains the authentication tag.
*
* Whether or not this function returns successfuly, the PSA core subsequently
* Whether or not this function returns successfully, the PSA core subsequently
* calls mbedtls_psa_aead_abort() to deactivate the operation.
*
* \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation.

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@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_update(
* This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating
* the inputs passed to preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_hash_update().
*
* When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive.
* When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
* If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
* state and must be aborted by calling mbedtls_psa_hash_abort().
*

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@ -848,10 +848,10 @@ cleanup:
* the more bits of the key can be recovered. See [3].
*
* Collecting n collisions with m bit long blinding value requires 2^(m-m/n)
* observations on avarage.
* observations on average.
*
* For example with 28 byte blinding to achieve 2 collisions the adversary has
* to make 2^112 observations on avarage.
* to make 2^112 observations on average.
*
* (With the currently (as of 2017 April) known best algorithms breaking 2048
* bit RSA requires approximately as much time as trying out 2^112 random keys.

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@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
/*
* Cookies are formed of a 4-bytes timestamp (or serial number) and
* an HMAC of timestemp and client ID.
* an HMAC of timestamp and client ID.
*/
#define COOKIE_LEN ( 4 + COOKIE_HMAC_LEN )

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@ -1234,7 +1234,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
add_data, add_data_len );
/* Because of the check above, we know that there are
* explicit_iv_len Bytes preceeding data, and taglen
* explicit_iv_len Bytes preceding data, and taglen
* bytes following data + data_len. This justifies
* the debug message and the invocation of
* mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext() below. */
@ -2404,7 +2404,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned hs_type,
unsigned char **buf, size_t *buf_len )
{
/*
* Reserve 4 bytes for hanshake header. ( Section 4,RFC 8446 )
* Reserve 4 bytes for handshake header. ( Section 4,RFC 8446 )
* ...
* HandshakeType msg_type;
* uint24 length;

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@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
#include <string.h>
/*
* Initialze context
* Initialize context
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx )
{

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@ -4017,7 +4017,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
}
/*
* Initialze mbedtls_ssl_config
* Initialize mbedtls_ssl_config
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_config_init( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf )
{
@ -6614,7 +6614,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
ssl->handshake = NULL;
/*
* Free the previous transform and swith in the current one
* Free the previous transform and switch in the current one
*/
if( ssl->transform )
{

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@ -2276,7 +2276,7 @@ start_processing:
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
} /* FALLTROUGH */
} /* FALLTHROUGH */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \

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@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@ read_record_header:
* Handshake layer:
* 0 . 0 handshake type
* 1 . 3 handshake length
* 4 . 5 DTLS only: message seqence number
* 4 . 5 DTLS only: message sequence number
* 6 . 8 DTLS only: fragment offset
* 9 . 11 DTLS only: fragment length
*/

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@ -1110,7 +1110,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
transform->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3;
/* We add the true record content type (1 Byte) to the plaintext and
* then pad to the configured granularity. The mimimum length of the
* then pad to the configured granularity. The minimum length of the
* type-extended and padded plaintext is therefore the padding
* granularity. */
transform->minlen =
@ -1425,7 +1425,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys(
hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac );
hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg );
/* Compute current handshake transcript. It's the caller's responsiblity
/* Compute current handshake transcript. It's the caller's responsibility
* to call this at the right time, that is, after the ServerFinished. */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( ssl, md_type,