Remove ciphersuite_info from ssl_transform

Prior to this commit, the security parameter struct `ssl_transform`
contained a `ciphersuite_info` field pointing to the information
structure for the negotiated ciphersuite. However, the only
information extracted from that structure that was used in the core
encryption and decryption functions `ssl_encrypt_buf`/`ssl_decrypt_buf`
was the authentication tag length in case of an AEAD cipher.

The present commit removes the `ciphersuite_info` field from the
`ssl_transform` structure and adds an explicit `taglen` field
for AEAD authentication tag length.

This is in accordance with the principle that the `ssl_transform`
structure should contain the raw parameters needed for the record
encryption and decryption functions to work, but not the higher-level
information that gave rise to them. For example, the `ssl_transform`
structure implicitly contains the encryption/decryption keys within
their cipher contexts, but it doesn't contain the SSL master or
premaster secrets. Likewise, it contains an explicit `maclen`, while
the status of the 'Truncated HMAC' extension -- which  determines the
value of `maclen` when the `ssl_transform` structure is created in
`ssl_derive_keys` -- is not contained in `ssl_transform`.

The `ciphersuite_info` pointer was used in other places outside
the encryption/decryption functions during the handshake, and for
these functions to work, this commit adds a `ciphersuite_info` pointer
field to the handshake-local `ssl_handshake_params` structure.
This commit is contained in:
Hanno Becker 2017-12-27 21:34:08 +00:00 committed by Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard
parent e7f2df03a3
commit 8759e16242
4 changed files with 55 additions and 57 deletions

View file

@ -1312,7 +1312,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
{
int ret;
if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange !=
if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange !=
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip ecjpake kkpp extension" ) );
@ -1675,9 +1675,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
/*
* Initialize update checksum functions
*/
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( i );
if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info == NULL )
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( i );
if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ciphersuite info for %04x not found", i ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
@ -1685,7 +1684,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info );
mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( ssl, ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %d", n ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, session id", buf + 35, n );
@ -2330,7 +2329,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server key exchange" ) );
@ -2670,7 +2669,7 @@ exit:
static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) );
@ -2692,7 +2691,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
size_t n = 0;
size_t cert_type_len = 0, dn_len = 0;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) );
@ -2893,7 +2892,7 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
int ret;
size_t i, n;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write client key exchange" ) );
@ -3183,7 +3182,7 @@ ecdh_calc_secret:
static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
int ret;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) );
@ -3213,7 +3212,7 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
size_t n = 0, offset = 0;
unsigned char hash[48];
unsigned char *hash_start = hash;
@ -3323,8 +3322,7 @@ sign:
* Reason: Otherwise we should have running hashes for SHA512 and SHA224
* in order to satisfy 'weird' needs from the server side.
*/
if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info->mac ==
MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 )
if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 )
{
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384;