Remove restrictive proto ver negotiation checks
Overly restrictive protocol version negotiation checks might be "version intolerant". TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 move the version to the "supported_versions" ClientHello extension. Signed-off-by: Glenn Strauss <gstrauss@gluelogic.com>
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2 changed files with 6 additions and 16 deletions
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@ -1121,7 +1121,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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{
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const unsigned char *p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
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mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version;
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uint16_t dtls_legacy_version;
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unsigned char cookie_len;
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse hello verify request" ) );
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@ -1146,15 +1146,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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* } HelloVerifyRequest;
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*/
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server version", p, 2 );
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tls_version = mbedtls_ssl_read_version( p, ssl->conf->transport );
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dtls_legacy_version = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
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p += 2;
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/*
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* Since the RFC is not clear on this point, accept DTLS 1.0 (TLS 1.1)
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* even if lower than our min version.
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* Since the RFC is not clear on this point, accept DTLS 1.0 (0xfeff)
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* The DTLS 1.3 (current draft) renames ProtocolVersion server_version to
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* legacy_version and locks the value of legacy_version to 0xfefd (DTLS 1.2)
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*/
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if( tls_version < 0x0302 || /* TLSv1.1 */
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tls_version > ssl->conf->max_tls_version )
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if( dtls_legacy_version != 0xfefd && dtls_legacy_version != 0xfeff )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server version" ) );
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