SHA-1 deprecation: allow it in key exchange
By default, keep allowing SHA-1 in key exchange signatures. Disabling it causes compatibility issues, especially with clients that use TLS1.2 but don't send the signature_algorithms extension. SHA-1 is forbidden in certificates by default, since it's vulnerable to offline collision-based attacks.
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7 changed files with 32 additions and 17 deletions
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@ -7162,7 +7162,7 @@ static int ssl_preset_default_hashes[] = {
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MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
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MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224,
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#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1)
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_KEY_EXCHANGE)
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MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1,
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#endif
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MBEDTLS_MD_NONE
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@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) {
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*/
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const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default =
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{
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1)
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES)
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/* Allow SHA-1 (weak, but still safe in controlled environments) */
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MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ) |
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#endif
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