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Remove FORCE_VERIFICATION and FORCE_BLINDING

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This commit is contained in:
Hanno Becker 2017-10-02 15:56:48 +01:00
parent 2fdffe0da0
commit 4e1be398f6
4 changed files with 5 additions and 134 deletions
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77
include/mbedtls/config.h
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@ -970,41 +970,6 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_RSA_FORCE_BLINDING
*
* Force the use of blinding in RSA private key operations.
* This makes these operations fail when the caller doesn't
* provide a PRNG.
*
* Comment this macro to allow RSA private key operations
* without blinding.
*
* \deprecated Disabling this option is deprecated and only
* disabled by default for backwards compatibility.
* Future versions of Mbed TLS will remove this
* option and enforce blinding unconditionally.
*
* \warning Disabling this can be a security risk!
* Blinding RSA private key operations is a way
* to prevent statistical timing attacks as in
* [P. Kocher ', Timing Attacks on Implementations
* of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems]
*
* \note Disabling this does not mean that blinding
* will never be used: if a PRNG is provided,
* blinding will be in place. Instead, disabling this
* option may result in private key operations being
* performed in a way potentially leaking sensitive
* information through side-channels when no PRNG
* is supplied by the user.
*
* \note For more on the use of blinding in RSA
* private key operations, see the documentation
* of \c mbedtls_rsa_private.
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_RSA_FORCE_BLINDING
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT
*
@ -1016,48 +981,6 @@
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_RSA_FORCE_CRT_VERIFICATION
*
* Force verification of results of RSA private key operations
* when RSA-CRT is used.
*
* Comment this macro to disable RSA-CRT verification.
*
* \warning Disabling this can be a security risk!
* Omitting verification makes the RSA-CRT
* signing vulnerable to the Bellcore
* glitch attack leading to private key
* compromise if an attacker can cause a
* glitch in a certain timeframe during
* the signing operation. Uncomment only
* if you're sure that glitches are out of
* your attack model.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_RSA_FORCE_CRT_VERIFICATION
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_RSA_FORCE_VERIFICATION
*
* Force verification of results of any RSA private key
* operation regardless of the algorithm used.
*
* Uncomment this to enable unconditional RSA verification.
*
* \note This is to prevent the RSA signing operation
* (regardless of the particular algorithm chosen)
* from potential future glitch attacks. We are
* currently not aware of any such for our default
* implementation, therefore disabling the option
* by default.
*
* \note Enabling it comes at the cost of roughly an
* additional public key operation at the end of
* signing (low compared to private key operations),
* as well as minor memory consumption.
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_RSA_FORCE_VERIFICATION
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST
*