Remove deprecated functions and constants.

Signed-off-by: TRodziewicz <tomasz.rodziewicz@mobica.com>
This commit is contained in:
TRodziewicz 2021-04-29 23:12:19 +02:00
parent baf4fc8c87
commit 18efb73743
27 changed files with 33 additions and 1146 deletions

View file

@ -921,15 +921,6 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
void mbedtls_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
const unsigned char input[16],
unsigned char output[16] )
{
mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( ctx, input, output );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
/*
* AES-ECB block decryption
*/
@ -994,15 +985,6 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
void mbedtls_aes_decrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
const unsigned char input[16],
unsigned char output[16] )
{
mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt( ctx, input, output );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
/*
* AES-ECB block encryption/decryption
*/

View file

@ -2691,26 +2691,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int rounds,
return( mpi_miller_rabin( &XX, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
/*
* Pseudo-primality test, error probability 2^-80
*/
int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
MPI_VALIDATE_RET( X != NULL );
MPI_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL );
/*
* In the past our key generation aimed for an error rate of at most
* 2^-80. Since this function is deprecated, aim for the same certainty
* here as well.
*/
return( mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( X, 40, f_rng, p_rng ) );
}
#endif
/*
* Prime number generation
*

View file

@ -1288,8 +1288,8 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_crypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD)
/*
* Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function shared by
* mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext().
* Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function used by
* mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext().
*/
static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
@ -1368,8 +1368,8 @@ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
}
/*
* Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function shared by
* mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt() and mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext().
* Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function used by
* mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext().
*/
static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
@ -1468,54 +1468,6 @@ static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
/*
* Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: public legacy function.
*/
int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len,
const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
unsigned char *output, size_t *olen,
unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
{
CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL );
CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL );
CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || output != NULL );
CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL );
return( mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len,
input, ilen, output, olen,
tag, tag_len ) );
}
/*
* Packet-oriented decryption for AEAD modes: public legacy function.
*/
int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len,
const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
unsigned char *output, size_t *olen,
const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len )
{
CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( iv_len == 0 || iv != NULL );
CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ad_len == 0 || ad != NULL );
CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || input != NULL );
CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( ilen == 0 || output != NULL );
CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( olen != NULL );
CIPHER_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL );
return( mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt( ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len,
input, ilen, output, olen,
tag, tag_len ) );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C)

View file

@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ exit:
}
/* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate with derivation function (SP 800-90A &sect;10.2.1.3.2)
* mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(ctx, additional, add_len)
* mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret(ctx, additional, add_len)
* implements
* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate(entropy_input, nonce, personalization_string,
* security_strength) -> initial_working_state
@ -340,19 +340,6 @@ exit:
return( ret );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *additional,
size_t add_len )
{
/* MAX_INPUT would be more logical here, but we have to match
* block_cipher_df()'s limits since we can't propagate errors */
if( add_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT )
add_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT;
(void) mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( ctx, additional, add_len );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
/* CTR_DRBG_Reseed with derivation function (SP 800-90A &sect;10.2.1.4.2)
* mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(ctx, additional, len, nonce_len)
* implements

View file

@ -416,6 +416,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
/*
* Deterministic signature wrapper
*
* \note The f_rng_blind parameter must not be \c NULL.
*
*/
static int ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
@ -469,69 +472,9 @@ sign:
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng );
#else
if( f_rng_blind != NULL )
ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng,
f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, rs_ctx );
else
{
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng_blind_det;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/*
* To avoid reusing rng_ctx and risking incorrect behavior we seed a
* second HMAC-DRBG with the same seed. We also apply a label to avoid
* reusing the bits of the ephemeral key for blinding and eliminate the
* risk that they leak this way.
*/
const char* blind_label = "BLINDING CONTEXT";
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx_blind;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx_blind );
p_rng_blind_det = &rng_ctx_blind;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( p_rng_blind_det, md_info,
data, 2 * grp_len );
ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( p_rng_blind_det,
(const unsigned char*) blind_label,
strlen( blind_label ) );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind );
goto cleanup;
}
#else
/*
* In the case of restartable computations we would either need to store
* the second RNG in the restart context too or set it up at every
* restart. The first option would penalize the correct application of
* the function and the second would defeat the purpose of the
* restartable feature.
*
* Therefore in this case we reuse the original RNG. This comes with the
* price that the resulting signature might not be a valid deterministic
* ECDSA signature with a very low probability (same magnitude as
* successfully guessing the private key). However even then it is still
* a valid ECDSA signature.
*/
p_rng_blind_det = p_rng;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/*
* Since the output of the RNGs is always the same for the same key and
* message, this limits the efficiency of blinding and leaks information
* through side channels. After mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is removed NULL
* won't be a valid value for f_rng_blind anymore. Therefore it should
* be checked by the caller and this branch and check can be removed.
*/
ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng_blind_det,
rs_ctx );
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind );
#endif
}
ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng,
f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, rs_ctx );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
cleanup:
@ -544,26 +487,8 @@ cleanup:
}
/*
* Deterministic signature wrappers
* Deterministic signature wrapper
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
{
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 );
return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
NULL, NULL, NULL ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
@ -750,10 +675,11 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_mpi r, s;
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( slen != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( slen != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
@ -803,22 +729,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
{
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( slen != NULL );
return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen,
NULL, NULL ) );
}
#endif
/*
* Read and check signature
*/

View file

@ -108,15 +108,6 @@ exit:
return( ret );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *additional,
size_t add_len )
{
(void) mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, additional, add_len );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
/*
* Simplified HMAC_DRBG initialisation (for use with deterministic ECDSA)
*/

View file

@ -3809,7 +3809,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_rsa_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)
/* `ecp` cannot be const because `ecp->grp` needs to be non-const
* for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign() and mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det()
* for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign() and mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext()
* (even though these functions don't modify it). */
static psa_status_t psa_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp,
psa_algorithm_t alg,

View file

@ -858,7 +858,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
&rec->data_len,
transform->taglen ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt", ret );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after encrypt: tag",
@ -1414,7 +1414,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
* explicit_iv_len Bytes preceeding data, and taglen
* bytes following data + data_len. This justifies
* the debug message and the invocation of
* mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() below. */
* mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext() below. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used", iv, transform->ivlen );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "TAG used", data + rec->data_len,
@ -1430,7 +1430,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), &olen, /* dst */
transform->taglen ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt", ret );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext", ret );
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );

View file

@ -4532,24 +4532,6 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char *dhm_P, const char *dhm_G )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &conf->dhm_P, 16, dhm_P ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &conf->dhm_G, 16, dhm_G ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_P );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &conf->dhm_G );
return( ret );
}
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
const unsigned char *dhm_P, size_t P_len,
const unsigned char *dhm_G, size_t G_len )
@ -5084,13 +5066,6 @@ size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( max_len );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ssl );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)